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Case No. 20170539-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.
ADAM ZAKARIA AHMED,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Adam Ahmed styles this as a case about a privilegewhether a court can permit the State keep a surveillance location secret. But
regardless of the answer to that question, Ahmed will lose this case because
(1) he has not challenged- as he must- the trial court's reasoning that
denying disclosure imposed a reasonable limit on cross-examination; and (2)
he cannot prove-as he must-prejudice. Because recognizing (or not) the
privilege will make no difference here, this case is a poor vehicle to decide
~

the privilege question, and this Court should not reach it.
Ahmed also argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to convict
vJ

him of possession with intent to distribute. Viewed in the proper light, the
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State's evidence- and reasonable inferences from that evidence-were not
only sufficient, but overwhelming: a seasoned police officer watched Ahmed
and his cohort Troy Pace deal "spice" (synthetic marijuana) for about half an
hour; the officer identified both Ahmed and Pace at trial; Ahmed and Pace
performed widely recognized roles for a two-person drug operation, with
Ahmed as the "dealer" and Pace as the "holder"; one of their customers was
arrested with a spice joint on him; both Pace and Ahmed possessed large
amounts of what chemical testing confirmed was spice; and Ahmed tried to
ditch his spice-filled coat just before he was arrested.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
~

1. Should this Court reach the merits of the trial court's privilege ruling
where Ahmed does not address each basis for the trial court's decision and
cannot show prejudice at any rate?

Standard of Review. Prejudice requires this Court to determine if the
undisclosed information creates a reasonable likelihood of a different result.
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a).
2. Was the evidence sufficient to show that Ahmed possessed spice
with intent to distribute?

Standard of Review. Jury verdicts receive substantial deference and are
overturned for insufficient evidence only if the supporting evidence and

-2-Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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inferences fall "to a level of inconsistency or incredibility that no reasonable
juror could accept." State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ,I18, 349 P.3d 664.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of relevant facts.
Officer Nicholas Telles was a bike cop assigned to patrol the Rio
Grande neighborhood - an area around the homeless shelter in downtown
Salt Lake notorious for drug dealing. R369-70; see also Katie McKellar,

Officials: Operation Rio Grande has brought 'zombie land' under control, available
at https:/ /www.ksl.com/?sid=46182718 (last accessed March 30, 2018)
(referring to area as an" open-air drug market" and a" zombie land"). Officer
Telles had hundreds of drug busts under his ·belt, dozens of which involved
"spice," or synthetic marijuana. R370-7l, 376, 422; see also National Institute
of Drug Abuse, Drug Facts: Spice (Synthetic Marijuana), available at
https://www.drugabuse.gov/ sites/ default/ files/ spice_l.pdf (last accessed
March 30, 2018).
Spice has a distinct look, packaging, and smell that set it apart from
other drugs. In its loose form, spice is a "leafy substance," but is "very
different in its color and texture" from marijuana, being "light brown," and
having flecks of "all different colors" in it. R424. In this form, it is usually
packaged inside 35mm film containers. R371, 425. In cigarette or "joint"
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forn1-which Telles had seen "thousands" of- the rolling paper is rolled
smaller and thinner than tobacco or marijuana cigarettes. R373-74, 383, 575.
And unlike tobacco cigarettes, spice joints come to a point at each end and
lack a filter. R373-74. Spice's distinct odor is similar to potpourri and is
"extremely potent and very unique." R371-72.
Drug dealers at the shelter have developed techniques to try and avoid
detection. First, they sell near the shelter where there are a lot of people
coming and going. R375. For the trained observer, dealers will stand out from
the crowd because they will stay in the same place, have quick conversations,
and do hand-to-hand exchanges. R376-77. Because some people sell legal
items (like sodas or clothing) in a similar way, dealers will often have those
items available as a" front" or cover. R378-79, 392.
Many dealers also work in pairs-one as the "holder," the other as the
"dealer." R430-31. The holder keeps most of the drug supply and money; the
dealer keeps a small amount of each on his person, and periodically visits the
holder to re-supply with drugs and off-load excess cash. Id. More complex
operations add surveillance (a "lookout") to guard against police and
security (the "muscle") to guard against robbers. R431-32.
Police have developed counter-techniques, including "surveillance
and takedown," to combat drug dealing. In this kind of operation, one officer

-4-
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~

watches for drug operations at a distance (often through binoculars), and
when he sees one, radios a "takedown" team of other officers, who swoop in
and arrest the offenders. R416. Officers try and keep their surveillance
locations secret to safeguard their work, themselves, and the property owners
who give them access. R271.
Officer Telles was in one of these surveillance locations. He was
between 40 and 60 feet away from the shelter, eight feet above ground level,
and watching through binoculars when Defendant Adam Ahmed and
~

another man (later identified as Troy Pace) caught his eye. R419, 432, 442-43.
The telltale signs were there: Ahmed and Pace were out in front of the shelter,
having quick conversations and doing hand-to-hand transactions, selling
spice with cans of soda. R417-18, 426. Pace was the holder, and had a
backpack with him; Ahmed was the dealer, and would periodically go up to
Pace or the backpack to re-supply with drugs and off-load money. R387, 43233, 439, 446, 612. Ahmed stood out because he was wearing a "very large,
heavy, tan coat." R435, 464.
After watching Ahmed and Pace deal drugs for about half an hour,
Telles called in the takedown team. R421-22, 435. Telles saw that as the team
pulled up, Ahmed dropped his coat. R435-36. One of the takedown officers
also saw Ahmed take off his "light-brown" coat and drop it to the ground
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when they arrived. R464-65. Telles watched the arrests through his binoculars
and was "100 percent certain" they had the right person when they arrested
Ahmed. R438, 609.
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court.

The State charged Ahmed with distribution of a controlled substance.
Rl-3.

ii

At preliminary hearing, defense counsel asked Officer Telles where he
was while doing surveillance; Officer Telles said that he "was in a nearby
office building," but declined to say which one for" safety purposes, because"
police "use that building still," and he "would prefer [drug dealers] not know
that we are in there." R241. Defense counsel acknowledged Officer Telles' s
concerns, but insisted he needed to know the location "in order to test [his]
ability to observe." Id. The prosecutor objected, asking that the court limit the
questioning "to how far he was or what he was able to see." R241-42. The
magistrate followed the prosecutor's suggestion. R242.
Defense counsel later filed a motion to discover the surveillance
location, claiming that it would aid in "collecting relevant and exculpatory
evidence" to ensure due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
and related state cases. R53-55; see also R261 (defense counsel asserting that
location information was "critical" and "highly exculpatory"). The

-6-
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prosecutor responded that "there is nothing exculpatory about granting
access to that room" because Officer Telles would testify that he had "an
unobstructed view" from about "60 feet away." R269. The prosecutor did not
"have any problem" disclosing "the distance and angle of his view," but did
not want to reveal the "exact location." Id. The prosecutor acknowledged that
"Utah courts have not ruled on this issue," but noted that "other courts have
compared the location of a surveillance tower" to the name of a confidential
informant and privileged it against disclosure to protect ongoing
investigations as well as officer and property owner safety. R270-71.
The trial court denied the defense motion after balancing the interests
of the defense in disclosure against the State's proffered safety and security
concerns. R281. The weightiest interest for the trial court was the need for
~

effective enforcement. The court noted that the Rio Grande area is "fairly
notorious in the community" and attracts "a certain criminal element in
society" that "distribute[s] controlled substances with the homeless people,"
"create[s] a crowd in the hundreds that mill around that area all day long,"
then easily" disappear[s] into the community." R282. Thus, law enforcement
had a "substantial need ... to be able to conduct undercover operations to try
and catch" drug dealers there. R282-83; see also R408-12 (prosecutor
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explaining in opening that Officer Telles observed from" a secret location, a
lookout post" and was trying to combat a "big drug problem" at Rio Grande).
The trial court reasoned that because "buildings are fairly low in that
area," the surveillance locations "are going to be limited," which
"heightened" the "in1portance of not revealing those locations." R283.
Further, because the legal defender's office represented the "lion's share" of
homeless defendants, the location information "would be easily disclosed
and distributed to others in that community," destroying effective
enforcement. R283-84. Finally, the court ruled that while the precise location
was not "material" to the defense, the State had to disclose the angle and
distance from which Officer Telles observed events. R283-84.
Officer Telles testified that he observed all the transactions with a
"clear" and "unobstructed" view from about 40 feet away. 1 R419. Because he
was using binoculars, his actual view was as if from about four feet away. Id.
Though an occasional car would temporarily distort his view, his downwardlooking angle prevented any complete obstructions. R420. As he watched, he

1

Officer Telles acknowledged that he said at the preliminary hearing
that he was 60 feet away, but claimed that it was "somewhere in that general
distance" -that is, between 40 and 60 feet-and that the extra 20 feet would
not have affected his ability to observe. R442-43, 448.

-8-
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~

stood on a desk, looking through a ground-level window about eight feet off
the ground. R419.
Defense counsel asked Officer Telles at trial if it was "[£]air to say" that
he would not reveal the surveillance location; he said he would not do so
"unless ... compelled by the court." R440. On redirect, he explained why:
"Primarily because . . . the location is typically someone else's private
property that they are allowing us to use for this purpose. We may use it
again in the future, to try to combat the drug trade in this area." R449.
~

Secondarily, "to avoid any type of retaliation" against the cooperating
property owners. R449.
The State's theory at trial was that Ahmed and Pace jointly possessed
the drugs in the coat and the backpack. R240-41, 410, 570, 612.
The defense theory was mistaken identity. See R412-13; 635-42. To
support this, defense counsel called the co-defendant, Troy Pace, who by then
had pleaded guilty to selling spice. R575-76. Pace claimed that he was the one
wearing the tan jacket and accessing the backpack, that he was acting alone,
and that Ahmed was not involved. R575-78. Ahmed also testified, claiming
that he was merely visiting a friend at the shelter and was not dealing drugs.
R585-86.
The jury convicted Ahmed as charged. R151.

-9- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ahmed moved to arrest judgn1ent based on the denial of his motion to
discover the surveillance location. R159-62. He analogized the surveillance
location privilege to the confidential informant privilege and asserted that
because there was "a reasonable probability" that disclosing the location
would have" confirmed or denied" Telles' s testimony, the court should order
disclosure and grant a new trial. Id.
The trial court rejected the informant privilege analogy, believing that
the issue was "more accurately addressed in the context of ... reasonable
limits on cross-examination," such as "relevancy." R686. As the trial court
saw it, cross-examination on the location could be limited due to "the
interests of the State in maintaining the confidentiality of the location,"
particularly where there was nothing showing "why that particular location
[was] pertinent to any of the issues" at trial. R686-87. To the extent that the
defense knew "roughly the distance, roughly the height," of the officer's
location and the kind of binoculars the officer used, the defense could
"reliably test most of the observation information." R687. To the extent that
there were unknowns, such as the number of people around the shelter or the
exact lighting, it could not be "re-enacted." Id. The court also noted the
"legitimate risk" that disclosure would pose to private citizens who offer
their premises for police use. R689. The court then reiterated its prior ruling

-10-
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and denied the motion to arrest. R689-90. It sentenced Ahmed to zero-to-five
years in prison, suspended that sentence, and placed Ahmed on probation.
R201-04. Ahmed timely appealed. R205-10.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ahmed first argues that this Court should reverse because the trial
court erred by recognizing a surveillance location privilege. This Court
should not reach that question because Ahmed has not challenged each basis
of the trial court's ruling-specifically, he has not addressed the court's
reasoning that refusing disclosure of the surveillance location was a
reasonable limit on cross-examination. Ahmed relatedly argues that this
~

Court should apply a harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prejudice
standard, and make the State prove lack of prejudice. But because he did not
raise a constitutional issue below, he is not entitled to this prejudice standard
on appeal. Rather, he must affirmatively show a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result to him absent the alleged error. He cannot do that on
this record because he has not shown that any obstruction exists in the small
area that Officer Telles described.
Ahmed also argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he
possessed spice with intent to distribute it. But there was ample- even
VJ

overwhelming-evidence that Ahmed intended to sell the spice in his coat
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and/ or in Pace's backpack: Officer Telles watched Ahmed and Pace deal
spice together for about half an hour; one of their customers had spice on him
immediately after doing a hand-to-hand transaction with them; lab tests of
samples from the backpack and coat proved that the substance was spice; and
Ahmed tried to dispossess himself of his coat the moment that police
approached to arrest him. This Court should affirm.

ARGUMENT
I.
This Court should not reach the merits of the privilege
claim because Ahmed has not challenged each basis of
the trial court's ruling and cannot prove prejudice. 2
Ahmed argues that the h·ial court erroneously denied his request to
discover the precise surveillance location because there is no surveillancelocation privilege under Utah law. Aplt.Br. 19-32. He relatedly argues that
this Court should apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prejudice
standard to this claim because, according to him, the court's ruling implicates
his right to present a defense. Id. at 32-34.
Ahmed's arguments fail to clear two procedural hurdles: (1) he has not
challenged each basis of the trial court's ruling; and (2) he has not preserved
a right-to-present a defense claim or argued any justification for appellate

2

The relevant trial court rulings are attached as Addendum B.

-12-
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review. He also carn1ot show prejudice under the applicable reasonablelikelihood standard because he did not lay any foundation below showing
that knowing the precise surveillance location would have yielded anything
material to his defense beyond knowing the distance. This is so because there
is no evidence in the record to show that there were any obstructions within
the 60-foot radius from his location. Thus, this Court should affirm without
deciding whether there is a surveillance-location privilege under Utah law.

I.J)

A. This Court should affirm because Ahmed has not challenged
the trial court's basis for ruling against him: that denying
disclosure was a reasonable limit on cross-examination.
This case presents a poor vehicle for deciding the privilege question
because Ahmed has not challenged a basis of the trial court's ruling. "Since
an appeal is a resort to a superior court to review the decision of a lower court,
Utah appellate rules require the appellant to address [the] reasons why the
district court's [decision] should be overturned." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56,

~

114, 194 P.3d 903. Where an appellant has failed to address either "the basis

of the trial court's ruling," State v. Needham, 2016 UT App 235, 12, 391 P.3d
295 (quotation simplified), or each alternative ground for a trial court's
decision, Salt Lake County v. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Development Corp., 2013
UT App 30, ,I28, 297 P.3d 38, this Court rejects his claim without addressing
the bases that the appellant does challenge. See also Duschene Land, L.C. v.
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Division of Consumer Prat., 2011 UT App 153, ~8, 257 P.3d 441 (rejecting clain1
where appellant had "not addressed the actual basis for the district court's
ruling"). When there is an unchallenged basis, issuing a decision on the
challenged one becomes an advisory opinion, because it will not change the·
underlying outcome. Utah courts are loath to produce such a result. See

generally Velasquez v. Harman-Mont & Theda, Inc., 2014 UT App 6, if18,318 P.3d
1188 (citing cases cautioning against issuing advisory opinions).
This Court should reject Ahmed's privilege claim because he has not
addressed the basis of the trial court's denial of his motion to arrest
judgment-that denying disclosure imposed reasonable limits on crossexamination. R686-88; see generally Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679
(1986) (explaining that State courts "retain wide latitude" under the
Confrontation Clause "to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination
based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, [a] witness' [s] safety, or interrogation that is repetitive
or only marginally relevant"). Rather than responding to this ruling, Ahmed
instead focuses on rule 16 and Brady discovery issues; the lack of a
surveillance location privilege in Utah law; and the reasons why the
confidential informant privilege should not be expanded. Aplt. Br. 15-32.
Because Ahmed has not addressed the basis of the trial court's ruling on his

-14-
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motion to arrest, this Court should reject his clain1 at the outset. Needham,
2016 UT App 235, if2.

B. This Court should apply the reasonable-likelihood prejudice
standard because Ahmed has not preserved bis right-topresent-a-defense claim.
This Court should also refuse to reach the merits of the privilege
question because Ahmed cannot show prejudice. The parties dispute the
proper prejudice standard in this case. Ahmed argues that this Court should
require the State to prove that the alleged error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because the court's ruling deprived him of the right to
present a complete defense. 3 Aplt.Br. 32-34. But because he did not preserve
this argument below, he cannot avoid his prejudice burden on appeal.

3

The "right to present a defense" was fashioned from elements of the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses, as well
as the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Holmes v. South
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,324 (2006); see also State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 174, 391
P.3d 1016; 306 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence
(3d ed. 2007), § 4:81 (citing cases). This right is "far from absolute," and
proving a violation erects a "high bar" for defendants to clear. Thornton, 2017
UT 9, ilif76-77; see also State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT 17, if17, 311 P.3d 995
(explaining that Sixth Amendment "does not sweep before it all rules of
evidence"). To prove that a State evidence rule-either facially or as
applied-violates this right, the defendant must prove that the rule or ruling
"infring[es] upon" his "weighty interest" and is "arbitrary [or]
disproportionate to the purposes [it was] designed to serve." Holmes, 547 U.S.
at 324 (quotation simplified).
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Preservation affects the prejudice standard on appeal here. 4 For most
preserved claims, this Court requires the appellant to prove that, but for the
alleged error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to
him. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (" Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.");

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (holding rule 30 prejudice
standard equivalent to reasonable-likelihood standard of Strickland v.

Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984)).
Where a preserved claim implicates certain constitutional rights, both
the prejudice standard and the burden-bearer shift, and the State must prove
the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 See generally Arizona v.

4

This is not always true, as unpreserved claims raised through the
rubrics of plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel share a common
prejudice standard that is identical to rule 30. See State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App
234, ifif 61-62, 387 P.3d 618.
5

Not all constitutional violations-even of enumerated rights, and
even if preserved-flip the burden and raise the standard. For example, a
defendant claiming that he was denied the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel must usually prove prejudice under the
reasonable-likelihood standard. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984). And a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) violates due process only if the evidence is
"material either to guilt or punishment." Id. at 87. Brady's materiality
standard is the equivalent of Strickland prejudice-indeed, it was the source
of Strickland's prejudice standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-09 (1991) (admission of coerced confession at
trial); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (confrontation
violation); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (right to remain silent).
rd

Generally speaking, this standard applies only to specifically-enumerated
rights, such as confrontation and the right to silence. See id.; cf Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (citing cases for proposition that
" [w ]hen specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has
taken special care" to protect them).
For unpreserved claims, the defendant bears the burden of proving

Strickland prejudice, even if, on a preserved claim, the burden would have
~

fallen on the State. See State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ,r,r41-46, 361 P.3d 104
(holding defendants bear burden to show Strickland prejudice on
unpreserved constitutional claims); see also Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S.Ct.
1899, 1910 (2017) (requiring defendant to prove Strickland prejudice on public
trial claim that, if preserved, would have been structural error).

Strickland relied on United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976), which
applied the reasonable-likelihood standard to Brady materiality. Augurs took
that standard in turn from cases involving knowing presentation of false
evidence. Augurs, 427 U.S. at 103 n.9 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972) and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)).
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Even assun1ing that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would
apply to a right-to-present-a-defense claim if preserved, Ahmed's claim is
unpreserved, which means he bears the prejudice burden.
The preservation rule applies to "every claim, including constitutional
questions." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r11, 10 P.3d 346. To preserve a claim
for appeal, a defendant must make a "timely and specific objection" in the
trial court. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ,r45, 114 P.3d 551. "To be specific, the
objection must present the issue to the [trial] court in such a way that [it] has
an opportunity to rule on that issue." State v. Martin, 2017 UT 63, ,r25 _ P.3d
_ (quotation simplified, emphasis added). Related objections to the same
evidence are not enough. "If a party makes an objection at trial based on one
ground, this objection does not preserve for appeal any alternative grounds
for objection." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r17, 192 P.3d 867; see, e.g., State v.

Clark, 2016 UT App 120, ,r9, 376 P.3d 1089 (holding that hearsay objection
cannot preserve a confrontation objection); State v. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133,

,r,r21-22, 352 P.3d 107 (holding that relevance objection did not preserve
character evidence claim).
At no time during the proceedings below did counsel argue that the
right to present a defense was at issue, cite cases relevant to that right, or ask
the trial court to walk through the requisite analysis. The trial court thus did
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not have the opportunity to rule on this issue, and it is unpreserved. Martin,
2017 UT 63, ,f 25.
II

Ahmed asserts that his counsel's argument that due process" entitled
him to know the surveillance location sufficed to entitle him to the
heightened standard of review on appeal. Aplt.Br. 32-33. Ahmed is wrong. In
context, counsel was referring to the due process right to exculpatory
evidence under rule 16 and Brady. R53-54. He was not referring to the right
to present a defense. 6
ts

Indeed, "due process" is as broad a term as exists in the law, and can
refer to a myriad of both procedural and substantive matters, each with its
own unique analysis. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(discussing substantive due process and fundamental rights analysis);
VP

Matthews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (discussing requirements for
procedural due process); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) (discussing due process requirements for personal jurisdiction); Board

of Comm'rs of Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997) (classifying
Vb
6

Had appellate counsel addressed the basis of the trial court's rulingconfrontation- that claim would have been preserved and, if the right were
violated, the State would have borne the burden to prove that error harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. For whatever
reason, Ahmed chose not to raise that claim.
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overbreadth clain1 as substantive due process matter, discussing test). Given
the breadth of this term, a" due process" objection was not specific enough to

~

alert the trial court that the right to present a defense-and its unique test
grounded in multiple constitutional provisions, see above n.2-were
implicated. Because Ahmed did not rely on the constitutional right below that
he presses on appeal, this issue is unpreserved, and Ahmed must prove
prejudice. 7
C.

Ahmed cannot show prejudice on this record.

Ahmed cannot meet his prejudice burden on this record because his
claims are speculative. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (holding
that prejudice may not be" a speculative matter," but must be based in proof).
Granted, the nature of privileges makes the undisclosed information a
"known unknown." Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., Department of
Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002), available at https:/ /www.cspan.org/video/?c4619654/rumsfeld-unknown, last accessed April 10, 2018
(defining "known unknowns" as knowing "there's some things we do not

7

Further, the issues that Ahmed did raise below-rule 16 and Bradyimpose the burden on him to prove a reasonable likelihood of a different
result absent the alleged error. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 919 (applying rule 30
standard to rule 16 discovery violations); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
103 (1976) (holding Brady materiality equivalent to reasonable-likelihood
standard).
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know"). But under the facts of this case, counsel was required to do more
than speculate and lay a foundation using what she did know. 8
Counsel knew that Officer Telles watched through binoculars from a
window eight feet above ground level in a building that was between 40 and
60 feet from the spot where Ahmed was dealing drugs. And counsel knew
the site where her client was accused of dealing the drugs. That means that
the officer was in a building somewhere within a radius roughly the size of
the

Scott

M.

Matheson

Courthouse

rotunda.

See

Google

Maps,

https:/ / goo.gl/maps/DbHayR4KCWo (last accessed April 30, 2018). It
would not take much for counsel to go to the spot where Ahmed was and
look 60 feet in every direction to see if there were any obstructions - trees,
light poles, etc. -in front of windows eight feet above the ground in that
small area. If there were not any, then knowing the precise locale would not
aid him at all; if there were a number of them, he might have made the case
on the need for disclosure, both at trial and on appeal.

~

8

This would also be true under the right-to-present-a-defense rubric,
as a defendant making such a claim must provide "at a minimum, proof that
the evidence in question is essential to the presentation of a defense," by
"lay[ing] the foundation necessary ... in the trial proceedings below."
Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ,I,I78-79.
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ii)

California's approach is instructive on this point. California has a
surveillance-location privilege under which disclosure is required if the
location is "material" to the case. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1042(a); see, e.g. People

v. Walker, 282 Cal.Rptr. 12 (Cal. Ct. ·App. 1991) (upholding privilege claim).
This materiality standard-"no realistic possibility" of creating reasonable
doubt-is all but indistinguishable from the reasonable-likelihood prejudice
standard discussed above. See People v. Lewis, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 193 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009) (explaining evidence not material if officer's observations are
(w;,

"unquestioned" by other evidence or "sufficiently corroborated by
independent evidence" so that "there is no realistic possibility that disclosing
the surveillance location would create a reasonable doubt" about the officer's
credibility).
To show materiality, the defense must use the information at their
disposal and point out potential obstructions or other problems within the
identified area; if the defendant does not, then there is no basis to show that
knowing the precise location would make any difference. See, e.g., Walker, 282
Cal.Rptr. at 12 ("[I]t is difficult to imagine what more [the] defendant could
have gained by knowing the officer's exact location" given extensive crossexamination and lack of defense proffer indicating "that there was some
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point within the [identified distance] that the officer could not have observed
t@

him due to an obstruction"). 9
Ahmed has not shown prejudice here because he has pointed to no
potential obstruction-not one-within the small area that Officer Telles
identified. Further, Officer Telles' s observations were corroborated by (1) a
spice joint found on a recent customer of Ahmed and Pace's; (2) spice found
inside Ahmed's coat; (3) Ahmed dropping the coat as soon as he saw police;
and (4) the spice and money in Pace's backpack. Though Pace claimed that
the coat was his, R575, the jury was not likely to believe that where both Telles
and another officer saw Ahmed drop the coat as officers approached. R435,
464-65. Under these circumstances, there is no likelihood- let alone a
reasonable one-that the result would have been any different had Ahmed
known Officer Telles' s precise location. Because Ahmed suffered no
prejudice from the court's ruling, this Court need not reach the question of
whether the surveillance location privilege is valid.

9

Even if a defendant does identify some potential obstruction, the
location is still not material if there are locations providing unobstructed
views and other information corroborates the officer's observations. See, e.g.,
In re Sergio M., 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming
privilege claim where defense counsel identified potential obstructions, but
trial court found two unobstructed views within identified distance, and
seized evidence corroborated officer's observations).
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II.
The evidence amply sufficed to identify Ahmed and
show a nexus between him and the drugs.
Ahmed next argues that the State did not adduce sufficient evidence to
convict him of possession of a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent
to distribute because (1) the State did not chemically test all the drugs; (2)
there was not a sufficient nexus tying Ahmed to the drugs; and (3) Officer
Telles's identification of Ahmed is unreliable. Aplt.Br. 47-52. Ahmed is
mistaken.
"If there is any evidence, however slight or circumstantial, which tends

to show guilt of the crhne charged or any of its degrees, it is the trial court's

duty to submit the case to the jury." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,J33, 84 P.3d

~

1183 (emphasis added). The "legal standard applicable to a sufficiency
challenge does not focus on the strength of the prosecution's evidence," State

v. Harris, 2015 UT App 282, ,Ill, 363 P.3d 555; rather, courts afford
"substantial deference to the jury" and view "the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict." State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ,I18, 349 P.3d 664 (simplified). So long
~

as there is "some evidence" supporting each element when viewed through
this highly deferential lens, the verdict stands. See Montoya, 2004 UT 5, 129.
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A person may not "knowingly and intentionally . . . possess a
controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute" it. Utah Code

°

Ann. § 58-37-S(l)(a)(iii).1 For drug possession cases such as this, the State
4#

must show, based on the totality of relevant circumstances, a "sufficient
nexus between the accused and the contraband to permit an inference that
the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and
control over" it. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ,I19 (simplified). The State did that here.

Ahmed's identity. Officer Telles testified that he watched Ahmed for the
vii

half hour of his surveillance right up until Ahmed was arrested, and was "100
percent certain" that his fellow officers arrested the right guy. R421-22, 434,
~

438. The distinctive feature he focused on to keep track of Ahmed was his
"very large, heavy," tan coat. R435, 464,609. Telles had a "very clear view of
[Ahmed's] face," identified him for the arresting officers, and identified him
for the jurors at trial. R421, 436. This evidence more than sufficed to identify
Ahmed as the dealer.

Knowingly and intentionally possessed. Officer Telles testified that he
watched Ahmed (the dealer), working with Pace (the holder), selling spice
4,,J

for about half an hour. R421-22, 426, 430-32. Ahmed conducted numerous

10

Unless otherwise indicated, code citations are to the current version
for this Court's convenience.
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hand-to-hand transactions, wearmg a light brown coat and accessing a
backpack with drugs and money. R426, 432,435, 611-12. The substance they
were distributing had the distinct look of spice. R427-29. At least two officers
saw Ahmed drop his spice-filled coat the moment he saw police. R435, 46465.
All this evidence permits-even compels-a jury finding that Ahmed
acted knowingly and intentionally in possessing the spice; that is, that he had
the "conscious objective to" possess it and was "aware" that what he was
doing made possessing it a reasonable certainty. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2103 (1), (2) (defining "intentionally" and "knowingly"). Indeed, by dropping
his coat as police approached to arrest him, he demonstrated his knowledge
and intent by consciously attempting to dispossess himself of the drugs.

A controlled or counterfeit substance. The State's chemical tests of samples
from the backpack and coat showed that it was a variant of spice, which is a
controlled substance. R495-96, 539 (spice tested in this case was ADBCHMINACA); Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-4.2 (listing ADB-CHMINACA as a
controlled substance). This evidence proved that the substance was spice, and
the jury could reasonably rely on that. At a minimum, it provided a
reasonable basis to infer that the untested portions of the drugs were also
%;

spice.
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Even if the test were not enough-though it certainly was-the
untested portions of the substance had the distinct look and smell of spice
and were packaged in the way that spice typically is. R424-25 (describing look
and smell of spice); R479 (describing seized items); see also 572-73 (counsel
explaining that backpack contained 30-40 spice containers). A reasonable
inference from this is that the substance was either spice or a spice
counterfeit-either of which suffices to convict. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

2(1) (i) (defining "counterfeit substance" as one that is "falsely represented to
vi

be any legally or illegally manufactured controlled substance" and "a
reasonable person would believe to be a legal or illegal controlled
substance").

With intent to distribute. Ahmed and Pace were selling spice together for
at least a half an hour and had much more spice packaged for sale. R421-22,

426, 430-32. One of their customers-stopped immediately after a sale-had
a spice joint on him. R418-19, 430, 433-34, 453-54, 462. It is reasonable to infer
from this that Ahmed and Pace had been selling and intended to sell part or
all of their remaining inventory.
The State thus provided ample evidence - supported by reasonable
inferences - for the court to submit the matter to the jury; in fact, it had a duty
to do so. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,I33.
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Ahmed's contrary arguments do not undermine the sufficiency of this
evidence. He argues that the State's case was speculative because some of the
spice was not tested, the nexus linking Ahmed to the spice was weak, and
Telles's identification of Ahmed was not believable. Aplt.Br. 47-52.
As a threshold matter, he asserts that inferences are speculative unless
11

the facts can reasonably be interpreted to support a conclusion that one

possibility is more probable than another." Aplt.Br. 45 (quoting State v.

Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, if 16, 238 P.3d 1096).
To the extent that this language from Cristobal can be read to mean that
an inference is unreasonable if the facts equally support different conclusions,
it is wrong and conflicts with controlling case law. See State v. Legg, 2018 UT

12, if 11, _ P.3d _ (holding that this Court has authority to overrule its own
precedent based on relevant factors). An inference is reasonable-not

~

speculative-so long as it is based on evidence. Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015
UT 73, ,r12, 358 P.3d 1067. The inference need not be based on what appears
to an appellate court, on a cold record, to be the best or most believable
evidence. The jury's very role-to which this Court properly affords the
utmost deference, see State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13,

if 43 n.6, 392 P.3d 398

(discussing "healthy dose of deference owed to jury verdicts") (simplified)is to decide what the best and most believable evidence is.
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As the constitutionally designated factfinder, a jury can and must
decide where the truth lies by sifting and evaluating the evidence. This often
involves choosing who to believe, and in a close case a defendant might have
an exculpatory narrative that is equally plausible (at least on paper) to the
State's inculpatory narrative. But that does not justify taking the case from
the jury or overturning its verdict on appeal. That is why we have juries.
Courts are duty-bound to submit the case to them where there is "any

evidence, however slight or circumstantial, which tends to show guilt of the crime
charged." Montoya, 2004 UT 5, if 33 (emphasis added).
That said, Cristobal can also be read a different way: the court was
merely stating-if somewhat inartfully-that if it was reasonable for the jury
to believe evidence supporting one inference over another, then the result
would stand on appeal. This is nothing more than a run-of-the-mill
acknowledgment of the jury's well-defined role.
Ahmed's complaints do not show that the jury speculated, but merely
that it chose to believe the officers over Ahmed and Pace's testimonies.
Although the drugs seized from a customer were not chemically tested,
Aplt.Br. 47-49, there was extensive testimony about the distinct look and feel
of spice joints and the jury got to see the joints for themselves. R425, 462. As
shown, the jury could have at very least believed that the joint was a
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counterfeit joint, which would have been enough. It could have also
reasonably believed that the substance was in fact spice. Cf State v. Homer,
2017 UT App 184, 1111-12, 405 P.3d 958 (holding officer testimony without
chemical testing sufficient to bind defendant over on marijuana possession).
Because there was a basis in the evidence for this conclusion, it was not
speculative. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, 112.
As to Ahmed's two remaining contentions, the State has demonstrated
that the evidence tying Ahmed to the coat and the backpack was strong, and
~

Officer Telles' s identification was not so inherently improbable so as to
preclude the jury fro1n believing it. See generally State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13,
1130-39, 392 P.3d 398 (explaining difficulty of meeting inherent

improbability standard). Ahmed's arguments to the contrary, Aplt.Br. 49-52,
amount to nothing more than an invitation for this Court to re-weigh the
evidence, which this Court may not do. State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, 176,
387 P.3d 618 (explaining that this Court "may not reassess the credibility or
reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of
the jury verdict") (simplified).

CONCLUSION
This Court should not reach the merits of the privilege question for two
reasons: (1) Ahmed has not challenged the trial court's confrontation basis for
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denying his discovery request; and (2) he cannot show prejudice from the
trial court's ruling without evidence of any obstruction in the area. Further,
the evidence sufficed-indeed, it was overwhelming-to show that Ahmed
possessed spice or a counterfeit substance with intent to distribute it. This
Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on June 4, 2018.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General
vJ

/s/ John J. Nielsen
JOHN J. NIELSEN
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Appellee
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KeyCitc Yellow Flag• Negative Treatment
Unconstitutional or PrcemptcdPrior Version Held Unconstitutional by State v. Ainsworth. Utah App., Jau. 07, 2016

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts--Penalties

Currentness

(I) Prohibited acts A--Penalties and reporting:

(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally:

(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense,
a controlled or counterfeit substance;

(ii) dislribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute
a controlk:d or countcrfeit substance;

(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or

(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:

(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct that results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia
Act, 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act, or
37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Act, that is a felony; and

(8) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters

37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, 37b, Imitation Controlled
Substances Act, 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act, or 37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Act,
on separate occasions that arc undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom
the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.

(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1 )(a) with respect to:

(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony,

,!'

l
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punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years. ,111d upou a sr.:cond or subsequent conviction
is guiliy or a first degree felony:

(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, or a
substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or

(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule Vis guilty of a class A misdemeanor
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.

(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced
to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact fjnds a firearm as
defined in Section 76- I 0-50 l was used, carried, or possessed on the person or in the person's immediate
possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently.

vi
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (I )(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for an indeterminate term ofnot less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition
or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.

(e) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall report to the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing the name, case number, date of conviction, and if known, the date of birth of each person
convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a).

(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties and reporting:

(a) It is unlawful:

(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or
a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise authorized
by this chapter;

(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle,
boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or

\Ji

(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance.
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (::!}(a)(i) with respect to:

(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; or

(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor on a first or second conviction, and on a third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a

third degree felony.

(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction under
Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this
Subsection (2).

(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not
included in Subsection (2)(b)(i) or (ii), including a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or marijuana, is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a third conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor,
and upon a fourth or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.

(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Seclion 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of
confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree gri.:atcr than provided in Subsection (2)(6), and if
the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in:
~

(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be senlenc~<l lu imprisonment for an indeterminate term as

provided by law, and:

(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and

(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed
five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and

(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months
to run consecutively and not concurrently.

(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or(iii) is:

(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;

(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and

3
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~

(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction. guilty of a third degree felony.
~

(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not amounting to a
violation of Section 76-5-207:

(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's body any
measurable amount of a controlled substance: and

(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily
injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another.

(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body:

01

(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I. other than those described in Subsection (2)(h)
(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony;

(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or
(AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony; or

(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or Vis guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

t.:j

(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury or death as a
result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection (2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise
from the same episode of driving.

(j) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall report to the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing the name, case number, date of conviction, and if known, the date of birth of each person
convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a).

(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties:

(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:

(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license number
which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent oneself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler,
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;

. ,-

I'

;,:•.·

,r
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~

(ii) to acquire or obtain possession cif. to procure or attempt to procure the aclministr:.tion of. to obtain

a prescription for, lo prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or
failure by the person to disclose receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery,
deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the
use of a false name or address;

(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to utter the
same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or

(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug
a counterfeit controlled substance.

(b)(i) A first or second conviction under Subsection (3)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) is a class A misdemeanor.

(ii) A third or subsequent conviction under Subsection (3)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) is a third degree felony.

(c) A violation of Subsection (3)(a)(iv) is a third degree felony.

(4) Prohibited acts D--Penalties:

(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who
commits any act that is unlawful under Subsection (I )(a), Section 58-37a-5, or Section 58-37b-4 is upon
conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds
the act is committed:

(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools
during the hours of 6 a.m. through 10 p.m.;

(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of
those schools or institutions during the hours of 6 a.m. through 10 p.m.;

(iii) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility during the preschool's or facility's hours
of operation;

(iv) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center when the public or amusement park,
arcade, or recreation center is open to the public;

·----------Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

(v) in or on the grounds

or a house or worship as defined in Stci 11)11 7(1-I0-'.'01:

(vi) in or on the grounds of a library when the library is open to the public;

(vii) within any area that is within 100 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections
(4)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi);

(viii) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age. regardless of where the act occurs; or

(ix) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of a
substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as
defined in Section 76-8-311.3.

(b )(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned
for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this
Subsection (4) would have been a first degree felony.

(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.

(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a first degree
felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree
more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) docs not apply to a
violation of Subsection (2)(g).

(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(ix):

(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and
the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and

(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed
five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and

r..:,
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with the mental state

required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces,
encourages, or intentionaliy aids another person to coinmit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(ix).

(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true
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age: nor that lhe actor mistakenly believed that thL' location \\'hLTC the act occurred ,,_·as not as described in
Subsection (-+)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred \\'as as described in Subsection
(4)(a).

(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.

(6}(a) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (1) and (2), a plea of guilty or no contest to
a violation or attempted violation of this section or a plea which is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter
2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently reduced
or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement.

(b) A prior conviction used for a penalty enhancement under Subsection (2) shall be a conviction that is:

(i) from a separate criminal episode than the current charge; and

(ii) from a conviction that is separate from any other conviction used to enhance the current charge.

(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstanding a charge and
sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter.

(S)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or
administral ivc penalty or sanction authorized by law.

(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal
under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.

(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof that shows a person or persons
produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima
facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or
substances.

(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the veterinarian's
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled
substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under the
veterinarian's direction and supervision.

(l l) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:

(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation
controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
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(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's employment.

(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as defined in
Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial
purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1)
(w).

(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in Subsection 58-37-4(2)
(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for
bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion.

(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense under this
Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than IO days before trial.

(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.

(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause shown, if the
prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice.

(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a preponderance
of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the charges.

(13)(a) It is an aflirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered a controlled
substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person:

(i) was engaged in medical research; and

(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6.

(b) It is not a defense under Subsection ( l 3)(a) that the person prescribed or dispensed a controlled
substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2.

(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a controlled substance listed

in Section 58-37-4.2 if:

(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid license to possess
controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and
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(b) the subst,rncc

\\'.IS

ndminister:::d to the person by the medical researcher.

(15) The application of any increase in penalty under this section to a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(i) may
not result in any greater penalty than a second degree felony. This Subsection (15) takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of this section.

(l 6)(a) It is an affirmative defense to an allegation of the commission of an offense listed in Subsection ( 16)
(b) that the person:

(i) reasonably believes that the person or another person is experiencing an overdose event due to the
ingestion, injection, inhalation, or other introduction into the human body of a controlled substance
or other substance:

(ii) reports in good faith the overdose event to a medical provider, an emergency medical service
provider as defined in Section 26-Sa- l 02, a law enforcement officer, a 911 emergency call system, or an
emergency dispatch system, or the person is the subject of a report made under this Subsection ( 16);

(iii) provides in the report under Subsection (16)(a)(ii) a functional description of the actual location
of the overdose event that facilitates responding to the person experiencing the overdose event;

(iv) remains at the location of the person experiencing the overdose event until a responding law
enforccrncnt officer or emergency medical service provider arriws, or remains at the medical care
facility where the person experiencing an overdose event is located until a responding law enforcement
officer arrives;

(v) cooperates with the responding medical provider, emergency medical service provider, and law
enforcement officer, including providing information regarding the person experiencing the overdose
event and any substances the person may have injected, inhaled, or otherwise introduced into the
person's body; and

(vi) is alleged to have committed the offense in the same course of events from which the reported
overdose arose.

(b) The offenses referred to in Subsection ( l 6)(a) are:

(i) the possession or use of less than 16 ounces of marijuana;

(ii) the possession or use of a scheduled or listed controlled substance other than marijuana; and

9
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(iii) any violation of Chapter 3 7a. Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or Chapter 37b. Imitation Controlled
Substances Act.

(c) As used in this Subsection (16) and in Section 76-3-203.l l, "good faith" does not include seeking
medical assistance under this section during the course of a law enforcement agency's execution of a search
warrant, execution of an arrest warrant, or other lawful search.

(I 7) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is
held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

~

(18) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less restrictive than any
provision of this chapter.

(19) If a minor who is under 18 years of age is found by a court to have violated this section, the court
may order:

(a) the minor to complete a screening as defined in Section 41-6a-501;

~

(b) the minor to complete an assessment as defined in Section 4 l-6a-501 if the screening indicates an
assessment to be appropriate; and

(c) the minor to complete an educational series as defined in Section 4l-6a-501 or substance use disorder
treatment as indicated by an assessment.
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1

under oath at the preli.minary hearing, and I asked him a number

2

of questions specific to the eyewitness issue, and he testified

3

under oath about those issues.

4

eyewitness issues.

5

he would say, what he has said.

6

I did delve into it.

I have told you what

With regard to the motions, with the exception of

7

Ramirez, which I just told you today, all the rest of them were

8

filed within a statutory timeframe.

9

0J

So I think he has testified on

THE COURT:

10

MS. GARLAND:

11

THE COURT:

Okay.
Thank you.
All right, thank you very much.

Let me

12

do this.

13

location, I'm going to deny that motion.

14

t.houqh, to work with the Defense within the time period that we

15

have to see if we can at least allow some kind of viewing of a

16

similar angle and distance.

17

On the motion concerning the identification and the
I will ask the State,

It seems to me that what the main issue is, is

18

obtaining someone, some area of an equal height and an equal

19

distance away and allow them to view it that way.

20

that because of a balance of interest.

21

that's what I have to do here is balance the interests of the

22

Defense in disclosure and an opportunity to prepare as compared

23

to the State's interest.

24
25

And I do

It seems to me that

And I think that comes down on having the State allow
them to view something from a similar angle and distance and
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1

then t.est. the veracity of the abi-1ity t.o vie·vJ t.ha"C...

2

that because we know the distances in this case because it

3

was -- they used a laser pointer.

4

location, the height above the ground level of whatever it was,

5

and therefore I think it would allow the testing of that.

6

l\nd I say

We would at least know the

•

I would note as a factual background and a finding

7

that the area we are talking about is the shelter that's up

8

on -- is that 200 South?

9

it?

200 South and about 4th West, isn't

And don't hold me to the address.

I'm bad on addresses.

10

MR. BLANCH:

11

THE COURT:

12

Grande Street was on the west.

13

fairly notorious in the community, that there is a shelter

14

there and various other services.

15

the homeless people using that to leave during the daytime.

16

And because of just the location they seem to just mill around

17

the area, that there is a certain criminal element in society

18

that seems to intermingle, those who distribute controlled

19

substances with the homeless people, creating a crowd in the

20

hundreds that mill around that area all day long, and that it

21

seems to be a cover in some ways for distributors to be able to

22

control or ply their trade by using various people around to

23

hide the substance, the cash.

24

disappear in the community easy by that nature.

25

235 South Rio Grande Street.
That's why I couldn't recall where Rio

~

But the point is that area is

The shelter requires people,

They seem to be able to

And because of that there is a substantial need for
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~

l

law enforcement to be able to conduct undercover operations to

2

try and catch those distributing controlled substance in the

3

area.

4

limited number of locations from which surveillance can be

5

effective.

6

are only a few higher buildings.

7

locations are going to be limited.

8

importance of not revealing those locations is more heightened.

9

~

Because of that also there is going to be logically a

The buildings are fairly low in that area.

There

Just structurally those
And because of that the

As Ms. Garland indicates her office represents a

10

lion's share or a huge number of those clients.

11

reasonable to assume that they would have to disclose some of

12

that information to their clients.

13

location then would be easily disclosed and distributed to

14

others in that community, and therefore not so much as a matter

15

of officer safety, it would just take away the effective

16

effectiveness of any particular location, and, therefore, of

17

law enforcement.

18

effective law enforcement in that location.

19

believe that it is important to keep the locations.

20

I think it is

Those information -- the

And I think the community has an interest in
Therefore, I do

As far as comparing that with snitches or informants,

21

whether or not information is disclosed because the State --

22

whether or not the -- it has to be dealt with given the State's

23

either refusal to disclose the name of the snitch or some other

24

reason, that seems to focus on whether or not the evidence is

25

material to guilt or innocence.

And I just don't find that the
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1

location of the area chac the orricer observed co be that

2

material.
Really, it is a question of the credibility of the

3

4

officer.

5

testified about his ability to see.

6

talking in this context about the Defense's need to try and

7

cross-examine -- or hope to cross-examine that.

8

heard any evidence that there is anything specific in that

9

location that allows that.

10

The officer testifies about what he saw.

He

And so we are really

I haven't

And given the balance of all that

is the reason I am denying that motion.

11

As far as the motion concerning the expert testimony,

12

I'm going to take that under advisement.

13

am missing in this motion is the officer's testimony.

I would

14

ask tha.t that be done outside the presence the jury.

So before

15

the officer actually testifies about his expertise, I would ask

16

the State to let us know, and we will dismiss the jury and

17

allow you to attempt to lay the foundation.

18

It seems to me what I

I do believe that Rule 702 applies, and the rule

19

reads scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge may

20

serve as the basis for expert opinion but only if there is a

21

threshold showing that the principles or methods that are

22

underlying -- underlying the testimony are reliable based on

23

sufficient facts and data that are reliably applied to the

24

facts.

25

kind of a scie~tific test.

tv

I do not agree that that needs to be necessarily some
There are a variety of kind of

30
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1
2

3
4

5
6

individuals, was that recovered?
A.

The backpack was recovered, and inside of that there

was 32 containers of spice.
Q.

Okay.

And so all of the containers

A.

MS. VEDEJS:

Thank you.

I have nothing further.

* * *

9

CROSS-EXAMINATION

12

BY MS . GARLAND :

Q.

Officer, you said that you were doing some kind of

surveillance?

13

A.

That's correct.

14

Q.

Where were you while you were doing this

15

v1ere

That's correct.

8

11

L-J.J.O.L-

recovered were field tested and positive?

7

10

~h-d-

surveillance?

16

A.

I was in a nearby office building.

17

Q.

Which one?

18

A.

I would rather not say per safety purposes, because

19

we use that building still.

20

we are in there.

21

Q.

I would prefer them not know that

You know, I can understand your concerns, but you are

22

testifying as to things that you observed.

23

test your ability to observe, we do need to know where it is

24

that you were watching from.

25

MS. VEDEJS:

And so in order to

And, your Honor, I would just object or

8
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al.l.Oi.4ed t.o t.est.iry t.o now far he

l

I would ask thct he

2

what he was able to see.
THE COURT:

3
4

DP

was or
~

That will be the limitation imposed by

the Court today in this prelinlinary hearing.

Judge, I would say that in Brady v.

MS. GARLAND:

5
6

Maryland plus Mr. Ahmed's due process rights as protected by

7

not only the Federal Constitution but Articles 12, 7, 24 and 27

8

of the Utah Constitution would give us the right to find out

9

where this -- where this -- this location is so that we can

10

view what is viewable from that particular location.
THE COURT:

11

Well, that's fine.

12

for purposes of the preliminary hearing.

13

with the assigned judge.

But the ruling stands
You can address that

14

Q.

Officer, how long had you been at that location?

15

A.

I -- I can't say for sure, but I would say

16

17
18

approximately 20 to 30 minutes.
And you said you were viewing Mr. Ahmed from that

Q.

location?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

How far away were you?

21

A.

I would say about 60 feet would be my estimation.

22

Q.

And you were using -- you were viewing with your just

23

naked eyes or did you have a telescope or some binoculars?

24

A.

Binoculars.

25

Q.

What -- what -- what kind of binoculars?

9
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